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I. INTRODUCTION

A flowchart belongs in a commercial outline. Why would any selfrespecting legal scholar write a symposium piece presenting one? Well,
the Erie doctrine is different. First, it is very, very complicated. I have
never seen an Erie flowchart in a commercial outline that did not have
substantial errors or omissions. Academic treatment, for its part, tends to
work in the weeds, without presenting the Erie doctrine in an organized
and comprehensive way. What I offer below is, I think, the first correct
and complete flowchart for Erie cases.
Second, a properly formulated and sufficiently detailed flowchart,
with accompanying explanations, can go a long way toward quieting
academic worries that the Erie doctrine is fundamentally flawed. I hope
to show that Erie problems are standard choice-of-law problems, and the
way that the Supreme Court has told federal courts to deal with them is in
keeping with that fact. Even the disagreements one sees on the Court are

* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Many thanks to the
participants in the University of Akron School of Law’s Conference on Erie at Eighty for helpful
comments.
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just what one would expect given the nature of the choice-of-law
problems at issue. The Supreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence isn’t perfect,
but it largely makes sense.
The third reason an Erie flowchart is worthy of academic treatment
is that it helps highlight unexplored problems. Despite countless articles
on Erie, there is a surprisingly large number of issues that have not been
discussed in much detail. Identifying them is part of what I will try to do
here.
I begin by describing what I believe are the four considerations that
come into play in an Erie problem. I then present the flowchart, followed
by a lengthy explanation of each step.
II. THE FOUR CONSIDERATIONS IN AN ERIE PROBLEM
First, some fundamentals. An Erie problem arises when a federal
court facing an issue must choose between using a standard drawn from
another sovereign’s law or using an independent federal standard. I
believe there are four considerations that can come into play in the federal
court’s choice.
A.

Sovereignty Considerations

The first two considerations consist of reasons the federal court
might have to use another sovereign’s standard. The first and most
obvious of these is respect for the other sovereign’s lawmaking authority.
Let us call these sovereignty considerations.
Although the relevant sovereign is usually a state, it might be a
foreign nation. Indeed, the place of foreign law in Erie problems is a big
gap in the literature, which almost always speaks of Erie problems as if
they exclusively involve the choice between federal and state legal
standards. 1
An example of sovereignty considerations in action is Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins itself. In Erie, the Supreme Court held, in part, that a federal
district court in New York had to use Pennsylvania’s standard on the duty
of care that a New York railroad has to a Pennsylvania trespasser in
Pennsylvania, out of respect for Pennsylvania’s lawmaking authority. 2
Notice that if sovereignty considerations come into play, the other
1. An exception is Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 1531 (2011). For a response, see Michael Steven Green, Erie’s International Effect, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 1485 (2013). Also unexplored is the role of the law of federal territories such as the District
of Columbia or Guam, which derive their lawmaking power from the federal government.
2. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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sovereign must want the federal court to use its standard to decide the
issue (in the sense that the appropriate authorities of the other sovereign
would, if asked, say they want that result). Thus, to understand Erie as
being about respect for Pennsylvania’s sovereignty, we must assume that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would have said it wanted a federal court
facing the facts in Erie to use Pennsylvania’s standard. If it wouldn’t have
said that—if the standard was intended to bind only Pennsylvania state
courts—there would have been no assertion of Pennsylvania regulatory
authority the federal court in Erie could have failed to respect.
Although the terms “substantive” and “procedural” have many
different meanings, 3 a law can be called substantive if the sovereign that
created it intends it to be used in other court systems and procedural if the
sovereign intends it to be used only in its own courts. Unless otherwise
noted, that is how I will use the terms here. Thus, one can say that
sovereignty considerations are not implicated unless the other sovereign’s
law is substantive in the relevant sense.
One reason Erie problems are challenging is that it is so difficult to
determine whether another sovereign’s law is substantive or procedural.
Unless the question is certified to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, no
Pennsylvania state court will have occasion to answer the question.
Pennsylvania state courts are concerned only about what they should do,
not what courts in other jurisdictions should do. 4
In addition to being almost always unanswered, substance/procedure
questions are ubiquitous. Every time Pennsylvania law is made, the courts
of other jurisdictions can ask whether the law is procedural only, freeing
them to come up with their own standard for the matter. Since there will
almost never be an answer, they will be forced to speculate or engage in
the onerous process of certifying the question to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.
Surprises concerning substance/procedure questions take two forms.
First, a law can appear procedural, because it regulates court activity, but
turn out to be substantive. An example of such a surprise would be if the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that it wants the courts of other legal
systems to use Pennsylvania’s pleading rules when entertaining
Pennsylvania actions or that it wants Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations
to be used in other court systems whenever a party is a Pennsylvanian,
even when the cause of action is under sister-state, federal, or foreign law.
3. For a classic expression of this point, see Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and
“Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 341–43 (1933).
4. See generally Michael Steven Green, Law’s Dark Matter, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845
(2013).
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Second, a law can appear substantive, because it identifies the
content of the cause of action upon which the plaintiff claims a right to
relief, 5 but turn out to be procedural. I have argued that the conflicting
approaches in Erie 6 and Swift v. Tyson 7 were not motivated by
disagreement about federal courts’ constitutional obligations or by
jurisprudential disagreements about the nature of law but were the result
of two different (and equally plausible) views about whether state court
interpretations of the general common law prevailing in the state were
substantive or procedural. 8 Erie assumed that they were substantive (state
supreme courts wanted federal courts to follow their interpretations) while
Swift assumed that they were procedural (state supreme courts took the
general common law standard prevailing in their state to be a question of
fact about which federal courts could come to their own conclusion). 9 If
the question could have been certified to the relevant state supreme courts,
the disagreement would have been quickly resolved, although the result
would probably have been an Erie approach for some states and a Swift
approach for others.
It is important to recognize that substance/procedure questions are
unique in being systematically unanswered. It is common, of course, for
questions about the applicability of a jurisdiction’s law to certain facts to
have not been answered by the jurisdiction’s courts, requiring the courts
of other legal systems facing those facts to speculate or certify. For
example, Pennsylvania courts may not have said anything about whether
Pennsylvania negligence law applies to police officers when acting in the
course of their duties. But these questions of scope can be, and often are,
answered by the jurisdiction’s courts when they encounter the same facts.
A Pennsylvania state court can get a negligence case brought against a
police officer acting in the course of his duties. But there is a set of facts
that a Pennsylvania state court will never be faced with—namely one
where it is not a Pennsylvania state court but is instead a federal, or
California, or German court. Since it never faces such facts, it never has a
reason to speak about what should be done when they arise. Legislatures
5. Or it identifies defenses to the action that remove liability. In what follows I will speak of
the content of a cause of action without adding this qualification.
6. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
8. Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1120–27
(2011).
9. In Erie’s Suppressed Premise, I offer an account of why the Supreme Court in Erie could
require federal courts to follow state court decisions concerning the general common law prevailing
in the state even if the state courts themselves did not take them to be binding. Id. at 1136–54. I ignore
that argument here.
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will also rarely speak of the substantive or procedural character of their
laws, treating the question as just one of the many choice-of-law problems
that they leave to the courts.
Notice that substance/procedure questions concerning federal law
are not systematically unanswered, because appeals from state courts to
the United States Supreme Court can occur. Through the mechanism of
appeal, the Supreme Court has made it clear that its interpretations of
federal law are binding on state courts. 10 And it has answered many
questions about whether other federal laws are substantive or procedural
when state courts entertain federal causes of action.11
Unanswered substance/procedure questions bedevil Erie problems.
Much of the disagreement between Justices Stevens and Ginsburg in
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co. 12 concerned
a substance/procedure question about New York law: whether New York
wants federal courts entertaining New York statutory damages actions to
use section 901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law, which prohibits
statutory damages actions from being brought as a class. 13 No New York
court had—or ever would have—occasion to answer the question and the
Supreme Court (curiously) did not think to certify the question to the New
York Court of Appeals.
This problem of determining whether another sovereign’s law is
substantive or procedural is not confined to Erie problems. It is also faced
by state courts and the courts of foreign nations when they try to determine
whether they should use another sovereign’s law to decide an issue.
Indeed, the very same problem of whether section 901(b) is substantive
or procedural was faced by a Connecticut state court when it considered
entertaining New York statutory damages actions as a class. 14 In involving
substance/procedure questions, Erie problems are standard choice-of-law
problems, just like those faced by state or foreign courts.
There are three general approaches to substance/procedure questions
that courts tend to take, each with its advantages and disadvantages. The
10. E.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
11. E.g., Cent. Vt. Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915) (burdens of proof); Atl. Coast Line
R.R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199 (1915) (time bar). Foreign courts, by contrast, are still in the dark,
for the Supreme Court has no occasion to say what they should do.
12. 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
13. Compare id. at 428–37 (Stevens, J., concurring) with id. at 451–57 (Ginsburg, J,
dissenting). Another example is Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), in
which Justices Scalia and Ginsburg came to different conclusions about whether New York’s standard
for reviewing a jury’s award of damages as excessive was substantive or procedural. Compare id. at
429 (featuring Ginsburg arguing that it is substantive), with id. at 463–68 (featuring Scalia arguing
that it is procedural).
14. Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 826–27 (Conn. 2007).
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first is to apply forum law whenever the issue faced can be characterized
as concerning the means by which causes of action are to be litigated.
Forum law applies to all these issues, even if one might understand
another jurisdiction’s law concerning the issue to be substantive. The
main benefit of the forum-law approach is that it dramatically reduces the
number of substance/procedure questions a court must face.
The forum-law approach was, by and large, the traditional one used
by courts. 15 The only exceptions were a small set of issues that could be
characterized as concerning the means of litigating causes of action—
including statutes of limitations and burdens of proof—where another
jurisdiction’s law on the issue might be used if it was interpreted as bound
up with the cause of action. 16 In this narrow set of cases, the forum had to
speculate about whether the other jurisdiction’s law was substantive or
procedural. But most substance/procedure questions were avoided
entirely, including all questions of whether a third jurisdiction, different
from the forum and the one that created the cause of action, might want
its law to extend to an issue. For example, a California court entertaining
a Nevada action would apply California’s attorney-client privilege law to
communications between an Oregon attorney and her Oregon client in
Oregon, even though Oregon could be understood as wanting its law to
apply.
One possible justification for the forum-law approach is that even if
another jurisdiction’s law is substantive, the forum also likely has a
legitimate interest in its procedural law being used, and any conflicts can
be decided in the forum’s favor. But the actual justification for the
traditional approach was a rigidly territorial division of lawmaking
authority, in which conflicts between forum law and the law of another
jurisdiction were largely impossible. The forum state was understood as
having the sole power to regulate the means by which causes of action
were litigated in its courts, because the courts’ activities were within its
borders. To describe an issue faced by a court as concerning the means of
litigating a cause of action meant that forum law was the only one that
could apply. 17 By the same token, the sovereign where the cause of action
arose had the sole power to determine its content.
Modern approaches in the conflict of laws reject this sharp division
of lawmaking power. Lawmaking power is now thought to be concurrent
15. See Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws §§ 586–600 (1934).
16. E.g., id. §§ 599, 605.
17. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. BEALE, 1 A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 165 (1916); Michael
S. Green, Legal Monism: An American History, in Christoph Bezemek, Michael Potacs and Alexander
Somek (eds.), VIENNA LECTURES ON LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 23, 32–40 (2018).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/2

6

Green: <i>Erie</i> Doctrine Flowchart

2018]

ERIE DOCTRINE FLOWCHART

221

rather than exclusive. 18 Even if a jurisdiction’s law regulates court
activity, rather than defining the right upon which a plaintiff sues, it is
possible that it legitimately extends to other court systems. To find out
whether another jurisdiction’s law actually extends to an issue, a court
must do its best to discern whether the relevant authorities of the other
jurisdiction would say they want their law to apply. The benefit of this
scrupulous approach is greater sensitivity to the sovereignty interests at
play in choice-of-law cases. Its main disadvantage is difficulty of
application, given that there will be no direct information from the other
jurisdiction’s courts on the matter.
The third approach is to adopt some easily-applied test to decide, in
a rough-and-ready way, whether a law should be treated as substantive or
procedural without detailed inquiry into the intent of the particular
lawmakers at issue. Let us call this the rule-of-thumb approach. The rules
of thumb used are varied, but they all seek to capture sovereignty interests
more accurately than the forum-law approach but at less administrative
cost than the scrupulous approach. 19
Indeed, one can characterize both Swift and Erie as using a rule-ofthumb approach to a substance/procedure problem. Swift adopted the view
that all states considered their interpretations of the general common law
prevailing in their borders to be procedural, whereas Erie adopted the
view that they all considered them to be substantive. Each was largely
accurate for its time but missed nuances that a scrupulous jurisdiction-byjurisdiction approach might have caught, for there were probably some
Erie states when Swift was decided 20 and some Swift states when Erie was
decided. 21
Each of these three approaches—the forum-law approach, the
scrupulous approach, and the rule-of-thumb approach—can be found in
state courts facing substance/procedure questions. And because Erie
problems sometimes involve substance/procedure questions too, one can
find advocates for each on the Court.

18. Green, supra note 17, at 40–48; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313
(1981).
19. See, e.g., Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904) (adopting a rule of thumb in determining
whether a statute of limitations is substantive or procedural).
20. Connecticut is a possibility. See Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388, 407 (1836); Green, supra
note 8, at 1124.
21. Georgia is a possibility. See Slaton v. Hall, 148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929); Green, supra
note 8, at 1123.
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Borrowing Considerations

The second reason a federal court might use a standard drawn from
another sovereign’s law is that it serves federal regulatory purposes.
Because federal interests stand behind the use of the other sovereign’s
standard, one should describe the law that is applied as federal. A standard
from another sovereign’s law is incorporated into federal law. Let us
therefore call these borrowing considerations.
For an example of borrowing considerations in action, consider
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. 22 A Mississippi statute required nonMississippi corporations to register to do business in Mississippi before
bringing a lawsuit “in any of the courts of this state.” 23 The Erie problem
was whether a federal court sitting in diversity in Mississippi should use
the same standard. The Fifth Circuit, after reviewing Mississippi state
court decisions, concluded that the phrase “courts of this state” referred
only to Mississippi state courts. 24 But the Supreme Court concluded that
the Mississippi standard should be used in federal court anyway. The
reason could not be respect for Mississippi’s lawmaking power—by
hypothesis, Mississippi officials didn’t care whether the standard was
used in federal court. Their rule was procedural. Using the standard must
instead have served some federal interest.25
Failure to distinguish between sovereignty and borrowing
considerations is the main reason that the Erie doctrine appears so
puzzling to academics and judges. 26 If one assumes that the only reasons
to use state standards are sovereignty considerations, the Supreme Court’s
Erie jurisprudence looks deviant. Deference to state interests is much
more than one would expect. But when borrowing considerations are
added, the puzzle disappears.
Part of the problem is ambiguity concerning the word “law.” On the
one hand, “choosing Mississippi law” might mean giving a matter over to
Mississippi’s lawmaking authority. That did not happen in Woods. On the
other hand, the phrase might be used more broadly to mean using a
standard that is in Mississippi law, even when the reason one uses the
standard has nothing to do with Mississippi’s regulatory interests. That is
what took place in Woods. To avoid confusion, I will generally speak of
22. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
23. Id. at 536 n.1.
24. Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701, 704–05 (5th Cir. 1948).
25. The Woods court described this interest as avoiding “discriminations against citizens of the
State in favor of those authorized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Woods,
337 U.S. at 538.
26. For an example, see Suzanna Sherry, Normalizing Erie, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2016).
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a federal court applying state or foreign standards (and thus say that
Mississippi’s standard was applied in Woods) and will say that state or
foreign law is applied only when the reason is sovereignty considerations.
But deference to linguistic convention will sometimes force me to use the
word “law” when I mean standard, for example, when I speak of Erie
problems as concerning “choice of law.” Speaking of them as “choice of
standard” problems, although sometimes more accurate, just sounds too
odd.
Another source of confusion is the way that the terms “substantive”
and “procedural” are used (or misused) in Erie cases. In Erie parlance, the
Mississippi statute in Woods would be described as “substantive.” 27 But
that wrongly suggests that sovereignty considerations stood behind its use
in federal court—that Mississippi officials wanted the federal court in
Woods to use their standard. The Supreme Court didn’t care what
Mississippi officials wanted. The Mississippi standard was used for
federal reasons.
That sovereignty and borrowing considerations are distinct is evident
when they point to different jurisdictions. As implausible as it may seem,
in 2017 the Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed the state’s commitment to
a Swiftian view of the common law. 28 If a Georgia state court gets a
common law case that arises in Alabama, it will come to its own
conclusion about what the common law standard prevailing in Alabama
is. 29 What should a federal court sitting in diversity in Georgia do when
entertaining a common law case that arises in Alabama? Sovereignty
considerations recommend that it follow the decisions of the Alabama
Supreme Court. 30 According to the vertical borrowing considerations at
play in Erie problems, by contrast, it should interpret Alabama law the
way a Georgia state court would. 31
Of course, there is a good argument that Georgia’s approach is
unconstitutional. A less extreme example of sovereignty and borrowing
considerations pointing to different jurisdictions occurs when the forum
27. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); Windy City Metal
Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008).
28. Coon v. The Medical Ctr., Inc., 797 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. 2017).
29. This apparently applies to all common law cases, not just cases that would be described as
concerning the general common law during the Swift era.
30. Although the Alabama Supreme Court has never had occasion to say whether its
interpretations of the common law prevailing in Alabama are substantive, we can safely assume that
it thinks they are.
31. Federal courts in Georgia appear to have privileged borrowing considerations over
sovereignty considerations. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 n.6 (11th Cir.
1987); In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 677 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Briggs & Stratton Corp.
v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1343–44 (M.D. Ga. 1999).
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state makes the constitutionally permissible choice of its own law even
though another jurisdiction is more interested in its law applying. 32
Vertical borrowing considerations recommend forum law, while the
weight of sovereignty considerations recommend the other jurisdiction’s
law.
In Klaxon, the Supreme Court decided this conflict between vertical
borrowing considerations and the weight of sovereignty considerations in
favor of the former. 33 A federal court sitting in diversity should use the
choice-of-law rules of the forum state. I will discuss whether Klaxon was
rightly decided later. 34 But it is worth noting that with Klaxon in place,
the sovereignty considerations that a federal court is permitted to consider
in an Erie problem cannot point to a different jurisdiction’s law than
borrowing considerations do (provided that the forum state’s approach is
constitutional). If a New York state court would favor New York’s
interests over Pennsylvania’s interests and so apply New York law, a
federal court in New York facing an Erie problem can take into account
only sovereignty considerations in favor of applying New York law. But
even with Klaxon in place, the distinction between borrowing and
sovereignty considerations remains essential. Borrowing considerations
will recommend that a federal court in New York use a New York
standard when sovereignty considerations are utterly absent—when New
York officials do not care whether the standard is used in federal court.
Although borrowing considerations are particularly important in Erie
problems, they have a recognized place in other choice-of-law contexts as
well. Consider a California state court entertaining a Nevada cause of
action. The plaintiff has waited two and a half years to sue. Which
limitations period should the court use—the three-year period in
California’s statute of limitations or Nevada’s two-year limitations
period? Assuming that Nevada’s limitations period is substantive, in the
sense that Nevada officials want the California state court to use their
period, the court might use it out of respect for Nevada’s lawmaking
power. This is an example of sovereignty considerations in action. But
even if Nevada officials don’t care whether the California court uses their
limitations period, the court might use it anyway because that keeps
plaintiffs from seeking out California state court solely to take advantage
of California’s longer limitations period. This is an example of borrowing
considerations in action.

32.
33.
34.

See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
See infra Explanation of Question 10.
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Countervailing Considerations

In contrast to these two reasons to use another sovereign’s standard
to decide an issue, there are federal interests in favor of using an
independent federal standard. I will call these countervailing
considerations, 35 because they can recommend a standard that is different
from the competing state or foreign law—even though the federal
standard might, by chance, be the same as the other sovereign’s.
The following is an example of countervailing considerations’ being
decisive in an Erie problem. Assume that under the federal standard of
forum non conveniens a federal court entertaining some foreign cause of
action should dismiss it so it can be entertained by a foreign court. A
forum state court would retain the action. Because the difference between
the federal and forum state standards will motivate forum shopping,
vertical borrowing considerations recommend using the forum state
standard. But federal courts facing such Erie problems have uniformly
concluded that the federal standard should be used. 36 Some countervailing
considerations to which they have appealed to justify this conclusion are
federal interests in foreign relations and the difficulty the federal court
would face interpreting foreign law and getting access to foreign
witnesses.
Notice that a federal court balancing borrowing considerations
against countervailing considerations is balancing one type of federal
interest against another. The law the court applies is federal and the issue
is solely whether this federal law should borrow a standard from another
sovereign’s law or use an independent federal standard. On the other hand,
a federal court balancing sovereignty considerations against
countervailing considerations is trying to determine whether the law of
another sovereign or federal law should be applied. 37
Countervailing considerations obviously have their analogue in state
court. Consider our California state court entertaining a Nevada cause of
action. The plaintiff has waited two and a half years to sue. Sovereignty
and borrowing considerations can recommend using Nevada’s two-year
limitations period. But countervailing considerations can argue in favor of
35. Here I am following the language in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
36. See 14D CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828.5
(2009).
37. Sometimes both sovereignty and borrowing considerations recommend another
sovereign’s standard, in which case the standard could be described as the law of the other sovereign
and as federal law. There is no need to choose between descriptions, since federal law and the law of
the other sovereign have the same content.
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using California’s three-year limitations period. The period is an
expression of California’s regulatory policies concerning when plaintiffs
have waited too long to sue (such as when evidence is stale or plaintiffs
have waived their rights) and the California court could favor these
California policies over any California policies in favor of borrowing the
Nevada period and over any Nevada policies in favor of applying Nevada
law.
D.

Separation-of-Powers Considerations

To repeat, the first three considerations in Erie problems consist of
reasons for a federal court to use a standard drawn from another
sovereign’s law (sovereignty and borrowing considerations) and reasons
for it to use an independent federal standard (countervailing
considerations). So far we have assumed that federal courts are free to
answer Erie problems as they see fit, without their decisions being
constrained or influenced by the decisions of other federal actors. But that,
of course, isn’t the case. The fourth type of consideration concerns how
federal courts’ reasoning in an Erie problem is constrained or influenced
by federal enacted law, whether it is a provision of the U.S. Constitution,
a federal statute, or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP). Let us call
these separation-of-powers considerations.
Of particular importance in Erie problems is determining whether
federal enacted law has already answered the Erie problem in favor of a
federal standard, forcing the federal court to give priority to
countervailing considerations over sovereignty and borrowing
considerations. One of the most difficult issues in Erie problems is
deciding whether a federal court’s hands have been tied in this fashion. It
is also possible for federal enacted law to compel the federal court to apply
state or foreign law, privileging sovereignty or borrowing considerations
over countervailing considerations. 38
If a federal court’s hands are not tied, in the sense that it is not
following the mandate of some federal enacted law in answering the Erie
problem, then its decision can be described as a form of common law
reasoning. Notice that even then its reasoning can be influenced by federal
enacted law. In particular, federal enacted law can play a role in
generating some of the countervailing or borrowing considerations that
the federal court takes into account.
38. As we shall see, the Supreme Court has understood the U.S. Constitution as compelling
federal courts to favor sovereignty considerations in certain circumstances. See infra Explanation of
Question 9.
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Separation-of-powers considerations also have their analogue in
state court. Our California court deliberating about whether to apply
Nevada’s or California’s limitations period might find that it is compelled
to apply California’s limitations period because the California state
legislature has told it to do so. Or the legislature might have enacted a
borrowing statute that compels the court to use Nevada’s limitations
period, thereby favoring borrowing considerations. The separation-ofpowers considerations one sees in Erie problems are not unique to that
context. To sum up, Erie problems arise when federal courts facing an
issue must choose between an independent federal standard and a standard
drawn from another sovereign’s law. In making this choice, they can take
into account sovereignty considerations (does the other sovereign wish its
standard to be used?), borrowing considerations (are there federal reasons
to use the other sovereign’s standard?), and countervailing considerations
(are there federal reasons to use an independent federal standard?).
Furthermore, how the court takes these factors into account can be
constrained and influenced by federal enacted law, that is, by separationof-powers considerations. In considering sovereignty, borrowing, and
countervailing considerations, subject to the restraints of separation-ofpowers considerations, Erie problems look like normal choice-of-law
problems faced by other courts.
Now for the flowchart, followed by a lengthy discussion of each step.
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II: THE FLOWCHART

Q. 1
Is the case before a federal court?

Q. 2
Is the federal court entertaining
an action under non-federal law?

Yes

Yes

No

Identify the issue faced by
the federal court.

There is no Erie
problem for the
court to address.
The state court
faces a choice-oflaw problem or, if it
is entertaining a
federal cause of
action and is
determining
whether a federal
standard or an
independent
standard under its
own law should be
used, a reverse-Erie
problem.

Q. 4
Is the use of an independent
federal standard for the issue
demanded by a federal
statute? This will be the case
if the statute is “sufficiently
broad to cover the point in
dispute.” Notice that the
federal statute might direct
federal courts to come up
with an independent federal
common law standard for the
issue by considering relevant
federal interests.
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There is no Erie
problem to address.
All issues of court
administration are
governed by federal
law. Any laws that
states or foreign
nations want to be
used in federal
court are
preempted.
Occasionally federal
law might borrow
standards from the
forum state out of
convenience, but
such borrowing is
not due to a federal
policy of vertical
uniformity. Any
duty to ensure
vertical uniformity
rests on state courts
when they entertain
federal actions.

Q. 3
Is the use of an
independent federal
standard for the issue
demanded by the U.S.
Constitution?

Yes

No

No

No

Use the
independent
federal standard.

Yes

Q. 5
Is the issue rationally classifiable
as procedure? This is probably the
case if it can be characterized as
concerning the means by which the
non-federal action is enforced in
federal court.

No

Yes
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No to
Q. 4
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Yes to
Q. 5

No to
Q. 5

Q. 6
Is the use of an independent
federal standard for the
issue demanded by a
FRCP? The Supreme Court
has not provided consistent
guidance on this matter.
The official test is whether
the plain meaning of a
FRCP creates a direct
collision with the
competing state standard.
This suggests that a FRCP
cannot direct federal courts
to create an independent
federal common law
standard. But there is
evidence suggesting
otherwise. It also suggests
that the scope of the FRCP
should not be read with
sensitivity to state interests.
But there is evidence
suggesting otherwise.

Use the standard
that the state or
foreign nation
that created the
cause of action
wishes to be used
in federal court.
Congress is trying
to determine the
content of a nonfederal action. It
cannot do this
using its power to
regulate the
procedure of
federal courts.

Yes

Use the independent
federal standard.
Congress has decided
to preempt any
standards that states
or foreign nations
wish to be used in
federal court. It has
also decided that
using an independent
federal standard is
more important than
any federal policy of
vertical uniformity. If
the statute directs
federal courts to
create an independent
federal common law
standard, the court
should create that
standard on the basis
of relevant federal
interests without
taking into account
any policy of vertical
uniformity.

No
Q. 7
Is the issue rationally classifiable as procedure? (see Q. 5)

No
Q. 9
Is there a state or foreign
standard bound up with the
cause of action upon which the
plaintiff sues? In other words,
does the sovereign that created
the cause of action want its
standard for the issue to be
used by a federal court
entertaining its action? It is
unclear what method should be
used to determine this.

No
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Use the standard that the state
or foreign nation that created
the cause of action wishes to
be used in federal court. The
Supreme Court is trying to
use a FRCP to determine the
content of a non-federal
action. It cannot do this using
the power to regulate the
procedure of federal courts
that Congress delegated to it
in the Rules Enabling Act.

Y
e
s

Yes
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Yes to
Q. 7

Yes
to
Q. 9

No
to
Q.
9

Use the
relevant state
or foreign
standard. It is
possible,
however, that
a state or
foreign
nation cannot
displace
federal
common law
on an
insignificant
issue by
binding up a
standard on
the issue with
its action.

Q. 8
Does the way the FRCP regulates the issue
abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive state
or foreign rights? Scalia’s approach to this
question is to consider only whether the
FRCP can be understood as regulating the
means by which preexisting non-federal
causes of action are litigated in federal court.
Ginsburg’s and Stevens’s approaches would
look to whether the state or foreign nation
that created the cause of action wishes its
standard for the issue to follow its cause of
action into federal court. The
Ginsburg/Stevens approach is probably
controlling. Ginsburg recommends a
searching inquiry into whether the state or
foreign nation that created the cause of
action wishes its standard to be used.
Stevens recommends using a rule of thumb:
if the standard is in a nominally procedural
code, the state or foreign nation will be
presumed to be not interested in its standard
being used in federal court. Stevens’s
method is probably controlling. Whether
other sovereigns who did not create the
cause of action wish their standards to be
used by the federal court is irrelevant. The
FRCP preempts these state and foreign laws.

No

Use the independent federal standard in
the FRCP. The Supreme Court, using
Congress’s power, has decided to
preempt any contrary standards that
states or foreign nations wish to be used
in federal court. It has also decided that
using an independent federal standard is
more important than any federal policy
of vertical uniformity. If the FRCP
directs federal courts to create an
independent federal common law
standard, the court should create that
standard on the basis of relevant federal
interests without taking into account any
policy of vertical uniformity.
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Yes

Use the
relevant state
or foreign
standard. The
Supreme Court
is violating the
limits imposed
on FRCPs in
the Rules
Enabling Act.

16

Green: <i>Erie</i> Doctrine Flowchart

2018]

ERIE DOCTRINE FLOWCHART

No to
Q. 9

The federal
court is in the
common law or
“relatively
unguided” Erie
track. The
interests of
states or foreign
nations in their
laws’ being used
for the issue are
no longer a
consideration at
this point. The
law applied to
the issue will be
federal common
law. The
question is
solely whether
that law should
borrow the
standard that
would be used
by the state
court where the
action would
have been
brought but for
federal
jurisdiction or
whether it
should consist of
an independent
federal standard.
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Q. 10
Do the purposes standing behind the statute
granting the federal court jurisdiction generate
policies of vertical uniformity with the state
court where the non-federal action would have
been brought but for federal jurisdiction? In
diversity cases, there are two such policies.
First, a federal court should seek to create
vertical uniformity so that a party worried
about state court bias will not be discouraged
from going to federal court by disadvantageous
federal law. Uniformity will also keep a party
not worried about state court bias from going to
federal court solely because of advantageous
federal law. Second, independently of avoiding
forum shopping, a federal court should
recognize that Congress created diversity
jurisdiction to provide a federal forum free of
the bias that might exist in state court—not to
license it to create federal common law for
administering non-federal actions in the light of
any conceivable federal interest. Presumptively
the federal common law standard it uses should
be the same as that used in state court. If it
violates this command, the party disadvantaged
is being treated differently from someone in a
state court, for no valid reason. The federal
court is therefore inequitably administering the
laws. The existence, nature, and strength of
policies of vertical uniformity in connection
with other jurisdictional statutes may be
different.

No

Yes

Use an independent federal common
law standard arrived at by considering
relevant federal interests (excluding
any policy of vertical uniformity).

Q. 11
Is one of the reasons Congress created federal jurisdiction for
the non-federal action an opposition to the standard that state
courts would apply to the issue?
Yes
No
Use an independent federal common law standard arrived at
by considering relevant federal interests (excluding any policy
of vertical uniformity).
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No to
Q. 11

Q. 12
Can one identify the state court where the non-federal action would likely have
been brought but for federal jurisdiction?
No
Yes
Use an independent federal common law standard arrived at
by considering relevant federal interests (excluding any
policy of vertical uniformity).

Q. 13
Identify the standard that would be used by that state court. Then identify the
independent federal common law standard that would be used by the federal court in
the absence of any policies of vertical uniformity. In some cases, this standard will
simply be an unspoken practice of not following the standard used in the relevant state
court. If the independent federal common law standard for the issue is a matter of first
impression, the federal court will have to create a candidate standard. Then ask: is the
difference between the two standards so significant that the federal court’s use of the
independent federal standard would violate federal policies recommending vertical
uniformity? In connection with diversity cases the questions are: (1) whether the
difference is so significant that it would cause ex ante forum shopping between
federal and state court and (2) whether the use of the federal standard in federal court
would be the inequitable administration of the laws.

No
Yes
Use the independent federal common law standard.

Q. 14
Are there sufficiently strong countervailing federal interests in favor of the
independent federal standard, interests that would overcome federal policies in
favor of vertical uniformity?

No

Use the standard that would be used by the
state court where the action would otherwise
have been brought.
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III. EXPLANATIONS
With the flowchart presented, let us now consider each step in greater
detail.
Question 1: Is the case before a federal court?
If the case is not before a federal court, then there is no Erie problem
to answer. In a sense, this is true only by stipulation. Erie problems are
simply defined as concerning whether a federal court should use a
standard drawn from another sovereign’s law or an independent federal
standard. 39 If the question is whether a state court should use a standard
drawn from another sovereign’s law or an independent standard from its
own law, then the problem the court faces is not called an Erie problem,
even if it is similar to an Erie problem in other respects.
As we have seen, all the considerations faced by federal courts in
Erie problems—sovereignty, borrowing, countervailing, and separationof-powers—have their analogues in state court. It is true that vertical
borrowing considerations are unique to Erie cases and are generally more
significant than the horizontal borrowing considerations faced by state
courts. A federal court in California has more reasons to borrow standards
used by California state courts than a California state court has to borrow
standards from sister-state or foreign courts. The fact remains that
borrowing considerations can arise in state court too. Erie problems are,
in their essentials, like any other choice-of-law case.
But even though state courts face problems similar to Erie problems,
they are not called “Erie” problems. They are called “choice-of-law”
problems or (if the state court is entertaining a federal cause of action and
is trying to determine whether it should use a federal standard or a
standard from its own law) “reverse-Erie” problems.
Question 2: Is the federal court entertaining an action under nonfederal law?
If the only action a federal court is entertaining is under federal law,
then it is usually said that there is no Erie problem for the court to answer.
This is puzzling, for such a court can still legitimately ask whether an issue
should be decided using a standard from another sovereign’s law. In doing

39. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 161 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assoc. P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 406 (2010).
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so, sovereignty, borrowing, countervailing, and separation-of-powers
considerations can come into play.
Let us start with sovereignty considerations. It is true that if the
plaintiff is suing under federal law, the question of whether there should
be deference to another sovereign’s lawmaking power concerning the
content of the cause of action has already been answered in the negative.
It is federal law—rather than state law or foreign law—that is being
applied. But another sovereign might be legitimately interested in
regulating an issue related to how the federal cause of action is litigated
in federal court. Assume that an Oregon lawyer and her Oregon client
have a conversation in Oregon. The conversation is relevant to a case
brought under federal law in federal court. Oregon can have an interest in
its attorney-client privilege law being used, forcing the federal court to
weigh these sovereignty considerations against countervailing
considerations in favor of federal attorney-client privilege law, unless (as
is in fact the case 40) separation-of-powers considerations force the federal
court’s hands. Another example is a foreign nation that wants its statute
of limitations to be used by a federal court entertaining a federal cause of
action, because a party to the action is a domiciliary.
That said, federal courts appear to assume that federal law trumps the
law of any state or foreign nation that is interested in regulating how a
federal cause of action is litigated in federal court. 41 Thus, it appears that
federal courts have adopted the forum-law approach to
substance/procedure questions that arise concerning questions of court
administration in federal question cases.
Not only are sovereignty considerations ignored in federal question
cases, so are the vertical borrowing considerations that are so important
when federal courts sitting in diversity entertain actions under non-federal
law. Although federal courts entertaining federal causes of action will
sometimes borrow standards from the forum state for issues of court
administration, 42 this is for reasons of convenience, not because there is a
federal policy of vertical uniformity. One might wonder why no federal
policy of vertical uniformity exists in federal question cases. If the federal
cause of action can be entertained by both federal and state courts, there
40. Under Fᴇᴅ. R. Eᴠɪᴅ. 501, federal privilege law should be used in federal question cases.
41. For example, in Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of Am.
(UAW), AFL-CIO v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701 (1966), the Court treated the question
of the limitations period to use when a federal statute lacks one to be a matter of federal law, even
when a state statute of limitations is borrowed.
42. The most obvious example is federal courts’ borrowing limitations periods from forum
state law for federal statutes. See, e.g., id. at 703–04.
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is arguably a federal interest in avoiding forum shopping—in ensuring
that the choice of a federal forum is for the right reasons, not simply to
take advantage of some difference in standards of court administration
between federal and state court. That would be a reason for a federal court
in New York entertaining a federal cause of action to borrow standards
from New York law concerning matters of court administration, even
though New York officials do not want their law to be used.
Nevertheless, such vertical borrowing considerations are ignored in
federal question cases. The reason, I think, is that the duty to ensure
uniformity between federal and state courts when entertaining federal
causes of action is thought to fall upon state courts. The matter therefore
falls under the “reverse-Erie” rubric rather than being an Erie problem. 43
Question 3: Is the use of an independent federal standard for the
issue demanded by the U.S. Constitution?
At this stage one should identify the issue faced by the federal court
entertaining the non-federal cause of action. Given Erie’s rejection of a
Swiftian approach to the general common law, the issue is usually not
going to concern the content of the plaintiff’s non-federal cause of action.
It will concern court administration, such as how long the plaintiff can
wait before bringing suit without being dismissed as time-barred or how
specific the plaintiff should be in his complaint. There is an Erie problem
when the court is choosing between an independent federal standard and
a standard drawn from some other sovereign’s law to decide the issue.
As we have seen, separation-of-powers considerations can compel a
federal court to use an independent federal standard, whatever the court’s
own judgment about the relative weight of sovereignty, borrowing, and
countervailing considerations. This is obviously the case when a federal
constitutional provision tells the federal court to use a federal standard.
The court is bound to comply, even if sovereignty and borrowing
considerations would recommend using another sovereign’s standard.
Assume a federal court in California is entertaining a Nevada
common law action in which the amount in controversy is $100,000. The
Seventh Amendment tells it that the parties have a right to a jury trial.
Because this right has not been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, it does not apply in state court.44 If the Nevada action were
43. See Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865, 1909–
17 (2013).
44. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 432 (1996).
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before a California or Nevada state court, the judge would be
constitutionally permitted to act as the finder of fact.
It follows that the federal court must provide a right to a jury trial
even if sovereignty and borrowing considerations recommend otherwise.
It may be that Nevada officials want the Nevada action to be adjudicated
in federal court by a judge. That does not matter—the federal court is
forbidden to take this sovereignty consideration into account. It may also
be that the difference between the way the Nevada action would be
litigated in federal and state court in California will cause forum shopping.
That also does not matter—the federal court is forbidden to take this
borrowing consideration into account.
There remains the question of whether a federal constitutional
provision does indeed direct a federal court to decide an issue according
to a federal standard. If it doesn’t (and no other federal enacted law directs
the federal court to use the federal standard), then the decision to use the
federal standard is the product of common law reasoning. 45 The Supreme
Court has discussed when a federal statute and FRCP direct a federal court
to decide an issue according to a federal standard—placing the federal
court in the statutory or FRCP Erie “track.” But, to my knowledge, it has
not given us guidance in determining whether an Erie problem falls in the
constitutional track.
To repeat, if a provision of the United States Constitution directs the
federal court to decide the issue using an independent federal standard,
then the court must use the federal standard. If the answer is no, then one
moves on to consider whether any other federal enacted law ties the
federal court’s hands.
Question 4: Is the use of an independent federal standard for the
issue demanded by a federal statute?
If a federal statute directs a federal court to use an independent
federal standard to decide the issue and the statute is constitutional, the
court is again bound to comply, even if sovereignty and borrowing
considerations would recommend using another sovereign’s standard. By
enacting the statute, Congress has chosen to favor countervailing
considerations recommending the federal standard over sovereignty or
borrowing considerations and the federal court must defer to its judgment.

45. E.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 n.10 (1958) (treating
the question of whether an issue should be decided by a judge or a jury as falling in the common law
Erie track).
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Notice that how one describes the effect of the statute depends upon
whether sovereignty or borrowing considerations are defeated. If
sovereignty considerations are defeated, the statute preempts state or
foreign law. 46 If borrowing considerations are defeated, there is no
preemption, for state or foreign law did not purport to apply in the first
place. Instead the federal statute repeals any past federal law on the
matter—in particular, any federal common law that borrowed standards
from another sovereign’s law—and prohibits federal courts from
engaging in future federal common lawmaking that engages in such
borrowing.
The fact that putting an Erie problem in the statutory track may not
mean that any state or foreign law is preempted can help explain why the
Supreme Court jurisprudence on preemption—which arguably includes
the demand that federal statutes be read narrowly to avoid having a
preemptive effect on state 47 (and perhaps foreign 48) law—is not generally
referred to in an Erie context. The Court has instead said that an Erie
problem falls within the statutory track just so long as the statute is
“sufficiently broad to cover the point in dispute.” 49
Notice that a federal statute might direct a federal court to use an
independent federal standard not by identifying the standard to be used,
but by directing the federal court to consider federal interests and come
up with the standard itself through common law reasoning. 50 When the
effect of the statute is to override sovereignty considerations, this amounts
to “field” preemption. 51 State or foreign law is displaced and the federal
court is directed to fill the void with federal common law. When the
statute’s effect is only to override borrowing considerations, there is no
field preemption. Federal common law applies even before the statute is
enacted. What the statute does is remove borrowing considerations from

46. For an article that looks at Erie problems in the statutory and FRCP track from the
perspective of preemption, see Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Erie and Preemption: Killing One Bird with
Two Stones, 90 IND. L.J. 1591 (2015).
47. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001).
48. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (discussing a
presumption against extraterritoriality). See also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64 (1804) (discussing a presumption against preemption of international law).
49. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 n.4 (1988). Another reason Supreme
Court jurisprudence on preemption is largely ignored in Erie problems is that even when there is
preemption, its effect is limited. In the usual preemption context, state or foreign law is preempted in
state as well as federal court. But in an Erie context the federal statute preempts state or foreign law
only in federal court.
50. See, e.g., id. See also Rensberger, supra note 46, at 1602–03.
51. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480–81 (2018); Gade v. Nat’l
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 109 (1992).
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the federal policies that federal courts should take into account when
creating federal common law rules for the issue.
Question 5: Is the issue rationally classifiable as procedure?
If a federal statute demands that the federal court use an independent
federal standard for the issue, the only remaining question is whether the
statute is constitutional. Here the Supreme Court has attributed broad
powers to Congress to regulate the activities of federal district courts. The
only thing that matters, as the Court in Hanna has told us, is that the issue
regulated is “rationally capable of classification” as procedure.52
The source of this broad authority is the power to establish the lower
federal courts, combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause. 53 A
neglected issue is the role of other constitutional provisions empowering
Congress, such as the Commerce Clause. It is true that if the Commerce
Clause is used to create the federal cause of action upon which the plaintiff
sues, then we are no longer facing an Erie problem (see Question 2). But
the Commerce Clause might be the source of power to regulate the
activities of federal courts when entertaining non-federal causes of
action. 54 There has been little discussion of this matter.
There has also been little discussion of what the Hanna test actually
means. The word “procedure” is not being used with the meaning I
identified above. 55 If it were, the Hanna test would be satisfied if the
statute were meant to apply only in federal court. That would allow a
federal statute to replace the entire content of the non-federal cause of
action, so long as the replacement did not purport to extend to state or
foreign courts. Instead it is an issue, rather than a law, that is being
characterized as procedure. It appears that characterizing an issue as
procedure means treating it as concerning the means by which a
preexisting cause of action is litigated, rather than the content of the cause
of action itself.
One benefit of the Hanna test is that it frees a federal court from
being constitutionally compelled to speculate about the substantive nature
of state or foreign law. It can adopt the forum-law approach to
substance/procedure questions in statutory track Erie problems. Still, one
wonders whether the Supreme Court would stick to the Hanna test when
52. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
53. Id. at 472–74.
54. Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (using
Commerce Clause to justify constitutionality of Federal Arbitration Act).
55. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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a federal statute overrides an explicitly substantive standard that is bound
up with a state or foreign cause of action. Imagine that Pennsylvania’s
wrongful death statute says that the two-year time limit for the action is
meant to follow it into federal, sister-state, and foreign courts. Could
Congress really pass a three-year statute of limitations for wrongful death
actions that would allow the Pennsylvania action to be brought in federal
court after two years had passed? How can one understand the statute as
concerning the means by which the Pennsylvania action is litigated in
federal court when the statute displaces part of the cause of action itself?
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed such cases, we don’t
really know that much about when Congress’s goal of regulating the
activities of federal courts can override substantive state and foreign law.
In this respect, however, the situation is similar to state court, for the
Supreme Court has also failed to answer when a state’s interest in
regulating the activities of its courts can override substantive sister-state
or foreign law. 56
If we take the Supreme Court at its word in Hanna, however, the fact
that the issue regulated by the federal statute is rationally classifiable as
procedure means the federal standard in the statute must be used. If the
issue cannot be so characterized, the statute is unconstitutional. 57 The
failure of the statute to pass the Hanna test suggests that it improperly
sought to regulate the content of the non-federal cause of action. 58 If so,
then the court should apply the relevant non-federal law.

56. For example, the Supreme Court has not told us whether a forum state may prefer its longer
statute of limitations over a substantive sister state limitations period. The closest it has come is Sun
Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), which told us only that the court had the power to apply its
statute of limitations in the absence of competing substantive sister state law. Id. at 729 n.3.
57. Unless some other source of congressional power, such as the Commerce Clause, is relied
upon.
58. Actually, it is not clear that Congress’s purpose would be improper if the state did not
consider its view about the standard to be substantive. Consider Georgia, which remains committed
to a Swiftian view of the common law. It apparently thinks that the common law standard prevailing
in Georgia is a matter of fact concerning which federal courts may come to their own judgment. What
if Congress decided to take the matter away from federal courts and answer by statute what the federal
view of the common law standard in Georgia is? (Notice that the statute would only tell federal courts
what to do with such cases—it would not purport to bind state courts.) Since Georgia does not
consider its standard to be substantive, it is hard to see how it could complain. And yet Hanna would
be violated, for the issue the statute regulates is the content of the non-federal cause of action, not
mere questions of court administration.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 2

240

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:215

Question 6: Is the use of an independent federal standard for the
issue demanded by a FRCP?
If no federal constitutional provision or federal statute demands an
independent federal standard for the issue, one moves on to ask whether
a FRCP makes that demand. If a FRCP directs the federal court to use an
independent federal standard, and the FRCP is valid—in the sense that it
is within Congress’s power and within the power that Congress has
delegated to the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act (REA)—
the court is again bound to comply, even if sovereignty and borrowing
considerations would recommend using another sovereign’s standard. By
enacting the FRCP, the Supreme Court has chosen to favor countervailing
considerations over sovereignty and borrowing considerations, and the
federal court must defer to its judgment. If it is sovereignty considerations
that are overridden, the FRCP preempts state or foreign law. If it is
borrowing considerations that are overridden, the FRCP repeals any past
federal common law that borrows standards from another sovereign’s law
and prohibits any future creation of federal common law that engages in
such borrowing.
One would think that the test here would be similar to what it is in
the statutory context. At times the Court has suggested as much. The
question is solely “whether the scope of the [FRCP] in fact is sufficiently
broad to control the issue.” 59 There is no need to read FRCPs narrowly to
avoid conflict with state (or presumably foreign) regulatory interests. But
the Court has also suggested that the scope of FRCPs should be read with
“sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.” 60 Part of
the problem, as we shall see, is that the scope of the substantive right
limitation in the REA is itself a matter of some dispute. The idea that
FRCPs should be read in keeping with limitations imposed by the REA is
hardly surprising. The problem is that it is not clear what those limitations
are.
The Court also seems conflicted about the possibility of a FRCP’s
removing state or foreign standards from consideration in an area and
directing federal courts to fill the area in with independent federal
common law standards arrived at by considering relevant federal interests.
Officially the Court demands a “direct collision” between the FRCP and
the competing state or foreign standards to put the Erie problem in the

59.
60.

Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1980).
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7, 437 n.22 (1996).
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FRCP track. 61 So understood, a FRCP cannot direct a federal court to
create an independent federal common law rule. But it seems clear that, at
times, something like that is indeed taking place. 62
Question 7: Is the issue rationally classifiable as procedure?
If a FRCP in fact directs a federal court to use an independent federal
standard, the next question is whether the FRCP is valid. Congress cannot
delegate power to the Supreme Court that Congress does not itself
possess. Therefore, the matter regulated by the FRCP must be rationally
classifiable as procedure. (See Question 5.) If it is not, the FRCP must
have sought to regulate the content of the non-federal cause of action
being sued upon. The federal court should apply the relevant non-federal
law.
Question 8: Does the way that the FRCP regulates the issue
abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive state or foreign rights?
Even if the FRCP is within Congress’s power, it will still be invalid
if it violates the substantive rights limitation in the REA. The REA gives
over Congress’s power to regulate lower federal courts to the Supreme
Court, subject to the requirement that any FRCP the Supreme Court
creates does not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” 63
Notice that a FRCP apparently can be invalid because it abridges,
enlarges, or modifies foreign or even federal substantive rights as much
as state substantive rights. We can ignore federal substantive rights, for
that would take us outside the scope of an Erie problem. 64 But there
appears to be no reason that an FRCP cannot be invalid because of its
effect on foreign substantive rights. The role of foreign rights in
connection with FRCPs is another gap in the Erie literature.
The substantive rights limitation protects sovereignty considerations,
not borrowing considerations. If the Erie problem is in the FRCP track,
federal policies in favor of borrowing standards used by a forum state
court are already overridden. The only concern is whether the FRCP

61. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749, 750 n.9.
62. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities
of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 25–52 (2010).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
64. There would be no Erie problem, because the choice the federal court would be facing
would be between the federal standard in the FRCP and the federal standard in the federal substantive
right.
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overrides a state’s or foreign nation’s desire that its standard be used in
federal court. So understood, the limitation appears to force federal courts
to attend to the substantive nature of state or foreign law. But very early
on, the Supreme Court restricted the scope of the limitation in a manner
that freed federal courts from having to answer many substance/procedure
questions. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 65 the Court made it clear that a
right can be substantive for the purposes of the limitation only if it is tied
to the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sues. The right cannot be
based on state or foreign law unrelated to the cause of action, even if the
relevant state or foreign sovereign legitimately wishes its law to apply in
federal court.
Sibbach concerned the validity of FRCP 35, which permits a federal
court to order a party to submit to a physical or mental examination. The
plaintiff was suing under Indiana negligence law in federal court in
Illinois. Illinois law would not allow such an examination, whereas
Indiana law would. It is not implausible that Illinois officials would
legitimately want the privacy protections of Illinois law to extend to
federal courts in Illinois, provided that the invasion of privacy would
occur within that state. 66 But the Court held such concerns to be irrelevant
to the validity of Rule 35 because they were not tied to the Indiana cause
of action upon which the plaintiff sued. This reading appears to still be
accepted by the Court. 67 Thus, we can consider the Court to have adopted
the forum-law solution to substance/procedure questions when the state
or foreign standards at issue are not bound up with the cause of action.
Even if these standards are substantive—in the sense that the relevant
officials of the state or foreign nation would want them to be used in
federal court—forum law (that is, the FRCP) is assumed to preempt them.
What is contested on the Court is whether a state or foreign standard
can be a substantive right for the purposes of the limitation in the REA if
the relevant state or foreign officials want the standard to follow their
cause of action into other court systems. Here the Sibbach Court also
adopted the forum-law approach. 68 As long as the FRCP, by its terms,
regulates the means of litigating a cause of action in federal court, rather
than purporting to determine the content of the cause of action, the FRCP
65. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
66. I have argued that a state cannot have a legitimate sovereignty interest in its laws extending
solely to federal court. The scope of its interest must be on the basis of a criterion that could, in
principle, extend to a sister state court as well. See generally Michael S. Green, Vertical Power, 48
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 73 (2014). The fact that the invasion of privacy occurred in Illinois would be
such a criterion.
67. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
68. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13–14.
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is valid even if the interests of the state or foreign nation that created the
action are seriously compromised. Thus, one need not consider whether
state or foreign standards are substantive. All one needs to consider is the
purpose of the FRCP. It would follow that a FRCP could include a threeyear time limit for wrongful death actions, even when it overrode an
explicitly substantive two-year limit in the state or foreign statute creating
the action.
Justice Scalia adopted Sibbach’s forum-law approach in his plurality
opinion in Shady Grove. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, adopted a
scrupulous approach, in which the federal court undertakes a searching
inquiry into whether the state or foreign nation that created the cause of
action would want its standard to follow the action into federal court. 69
This has the benefit of showing respect for state and foreign regulatory
interests, but it greatly increases the administrative burden on federal
courts. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in Shady Grove, adopted a ruleof-thumb approach, according to which a statute that falls within a
nominally procedural code (as the New York law at issue did) is
presumptively procedural in the absence of persuasive evidence that it is
substantive. 70 Stevens’s approach is generally taken to be controlling, but
the main point for our purposes is that the disagreement on the Court is
precisely what one would expect given the substance/procedure question
it faced.
Notice that when one considers whether a FRCP abridges, enlarges,
or modifies state or foreign substantive rights in a diversity case, the only
substantive rights one considers are those that are tied to the cause of
action identified by the forum’s choice-of-law rules, as required by
Klaxon. (Whether Klaxon applies in jurisdictional contexts other than
diversity, however, is a matter that needs to be addressed independently.)
Thus, it is entirely possible for a FRCP to be valid in a diversity case even
though it abridges, enlarges, or modifies a substantive right, so long as the
cause of action to which the substantive right belongs would not be chosen
by a forum state court.
To sum up, if the FRCP abridges, enlarges, or modifies a substantive
right tied to the cause of action, then the FRCP is invalid (or should be
reread more narrowly to avoid the conflict with the state or foreign
substantive law). 71 The issue must be decided according to the relevant
state or foreign substantive law. But if the FRCP does not abridge, enlarge,

69. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 444–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 431–36.
71. See, e.g., id. at 437.
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or modify substantive rights, the federal standard in the FRCP must be
used, even if sovereignty or borrowing considerations recommend using
a standard from another jurisdiction’s law.
Question 9: Is there a state or foreign standard bound up with the
cause action upon which the plaintiff sues?
If the use of the federal standard is not demanded by federal enacted
law, we are not yet in the federal common law track, for federal enacted
law might tie the federal court’s hands in the opposite direction, that is,
by demanding that it use the competing state or foreign standard. The
language of Question 9 is drawn from Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc., 72, which suggests that in the absence of federal enacted
law to the contrary, a federal court is constitutionally required to use a
state (and presumably foreign) legal standard for an issue if the standard
is bound up with the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sues. The
reasons for applying the state or foreign standard are clearly sovereignty
considerations, for the focus is on whether state or foreign officials want
the standard to follow their cause of action into other court systems.
Notice that in a diversity case one is concerned only about the substantive
nature of a standard that is bound up with what a forum state court would
choose as the cause of action, due to Klaxon. It is apparently possible,
therefore, for a federal court sitting in diversity to apply federal common
law that preempts a standard bound up with an applicable state or foreign
cause of action, provided that a forum state court would have chosen a
different cause of action.
Federal courts’ inability to preempt state or foreign law with federal
common law stands in contrast to Congress, which, as we have seen, can
preempt such law, as long as the issue can rationally be characterized as
procedure. It is not strange that a federal court’s power to preempt state
or foreign law would be more limited than Congress’s (although it would
appear to be more accurate to describe this restriction not as constitutional
in its source, but as a congressional demand). 73 But it is strange that
federal courts should always be obligated to use these bound-up state or
foreign standards, no matter what the countervailing federal interests in
favor of the independent federal common law rule happen to be. What if
a state bound up its service rules with its cause of action? Would a federal

72. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
73. After all, Congress could surely give federal courts the freedom to create federal common
law in any circumstance where Congress itself could regulate the matter.
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court entertaining the action be constitutionally prohibited from coming
up with an independent federal common law rule concerning service?
Finally, there is no guidance about how federal courts are to identify
whether the Byrd bound-up test is met. It clearly requires a federal court
to speculate about the substantive nature of state and foreign law. The
forum-law approach to substance/procedure questions is rejected. If the
scrupulous approach is used, the burden on federal courts will be
significant. The fact that Stevens’s rule-of-thumb approach is probably
controlling in connection with the substantive rights limitation in the REA
is a reason to think that it would be used here too.
Question 10: Do the purposes standing behind the statute granting
the federal court jurisdiction generate policies of vertical uniformity
with the state court where the non-federal action would have been
brought but for federal jurisdiction?
It appears that after one has passed the Byrd bound-up test, all
sovereignty considerations are left behind. The issue will be regulated by
federal common law and the question is solely what the content of that
law will be—whether it will use an independent federal standard or
borrow the standard that would be used by the state court where the action
would have been brought had there been no federal jurisdiction. As we
have seen, however, a state or foreign nation can have legitimate
regulatory interests in the activity of federal courts that are unrelated to
the cause of action. One would think that such sovereignty considerations
should have some capacity to weigh against a federal court’s decision to
apply an independent federal standard. And yet, as the Court’s Erie
jurisprudence now stands, there is no place for them to be taken into
account. 74 We must assume they have been preempted by federal common
law.
Setting aside sovereignty considerations, we now turn to the
borrowing considerations that are so important in the common law (or
“relatively-unguided”) Erie track. In diversity cases these have been
described as the “twin aims of Erie.” According to the twin aims, a federal
court sitting in diversity should use the standard that would be used by a
forum state court if the difference between it and an independent federal
standard would lead to forum shopping and the inequitable administration
74. Assume, for example, that a New York state court would apply Oregon’s attorney-client
privilege law to Oregon communications. Borrowing considerations will recommend that a federal
court in New York use Oregon’s standards too. But isn’t Oregon’s interest in its law applying in
federal court also relevant?
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of the laws. 75 The truth is that a federal court should use the standard that
would be used, not necessarily by a forum state court, but by the state
court where the action would have been brought but for diversity
jurisdiction. It takes further argument to conclude that this is a forum state
court (see Question 12). For the moment, however, I will assume that the
relevant state court is that of the forum state.
It is crucial to understand that the twin aims are borrowing
considerations, not sovereignty considerations. They cannot possibly be
sovereignty considerations, for state law is used even on the assumption
that the relevant state’s officials don’t care whether their law is used in
federal court. Woods is a particularly clear example of this phenomenon,
but countless others can be found. For example, in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 76 the Supreme Court told a federal court sitting in diversity in New
York that it had to use New York’s statute of limitations without making
any attempt to determine what New York officials thought about the
matter.
One important benefit of treating the twin aims as borrowing rather
than sovereignty considerations is that it eases the pressure on federal
courts facing common law track Erie problems. Unless sovereignty
considerations come into play, the law that is applied is federal and the
question is solely what standard best serves the balance of federal
interests. To make a mistake means that the federal court has created a
badly designed federal common law rule, with its costs felt only by the
federal government. It has not infringed upon state or foreign sovereignty.
It is also less worrisome if, as is sometimes the case, the federal court
creates a curious chimera standard, in which state and federal standards
are blended together.77 Understood as an exercise in respect for state
sovereignty, it is hard to see how such a result could be correct. But it
makes much more sense if we understand the standard as the product of
balancing competing federal interests.
Although looking at the twin aims as borrowing considerations goes
a long way toward making sense of them, a host of questions still remain.
The first is where they come from. The usual answer is the Rules of

75. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
76. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
77. This is a common criticism of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415
(1996). See Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U.
L. REV. 103 (2011); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An
Essay on What’s Wrong With the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 708 (2006); C. Douglas
Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU L. REV. 267,
269–70 (1997).
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Decision Act (RDA), 78 which states that “[t]he laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.” 79 But no one who gives the matter any serious thought can
be satisfied with this response.
Setting aside the substantial historical evidence against such a
position, 80 it is incompatible with the language of the RDA. First of all,
the RDA extends to all civil actions in the courts of the United States,
including actions brought under federal law. If the twin aims somehow
came from the RDA, a federal court entertaining a federal cause of action
would be bound by the twin aims too: if an issue of court administration
was not covered by federal enacted law, it would have to use the standards
that would be used by a forum state court. But that isn’t so. Second, under
the twin aims a federal court can be required to use foreign standards if
they would be used by a forum state court. But the RDA says nothing
about foreign law. Third, the RDA’s language is categorical, but the twin
aims are not. The RDA says that state law “shall be regarded as rules of
decision,” not that it shall be if the difference between state and federal
standards leads to forum shopping and the inequitable administration of
the laws. Fourth, the RDA says only that state law shall be used in cases
where it applies. State law applies when the state’s authorities would say
it does. But the twin aims are about state law standards being used when
state law does not apply, that is, when state authorities would not say their
law should be used in federal court. Fifth, the RDA says vaguely that the
“the laws of the several states” shall be used. But which state? There is no
suggestion that the answer is the law that would be used by a forum state
court.

78. E.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 722–23 (1974);
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39–41 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). This is the Act in its current form, which is not different from the
original form in any respect relevant here.
80. The RDA was probably not intended to be a restriction on federal courts’ power to create
common law. As Wilfred Ritz has put it, the Act—by referring generally to “the laws of the several
states”—is simply a “direction to the national courts to apply American law, as distinguished from
English law.” WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING
MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 148 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds.,
1990). See also Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism,
and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 106–08 (1993); Suzanna Sherry,
Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and National Common Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2135,
2137–38 (2008). The Act makes it clear that American rather than English law should be used in
federal courts. But it says nothing about the division of common lawmaking power between federal
and state courts.
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Let us therefore set aside the RDA as a possible source of the twin
aims. To which statute should one look then? In fact, it is not absolutely
necessary to ground the twin aims in any enacted law. The policies upon
which courts rely when making common law rules (including policies
recommending borrowing standards from other sovereigns’ laws) often
lack such a source. Nevertheless, I think that borrowing considerations in
Erie problems can profitably be understood as grounded in the statute
giving the federal court jurisdiction over the non-federal cause of action. 81
In diversity cases, that is, of course, the diversity statute. 82 It follows that
the twin aims might not be relevant for other forms of federal jurisdiction.
The argument for vertical uniformity depends upon the form of federal
jurisdiction at issue.
The diversity statute can be understood as recommending vertical
uniformity according to the following plausible argument: The purpose of
diversity, it is usually said, is to provide an out-of-state party with a forum
free from the bias in favor of locals that might exist in state court. 83 If that
is the case, there are good reasons for federal courts sitting in diversity to
borrow standards for court administration from a forum state court.
Assume federal courts used a federal common law limitations period that
is shorter than that used by a forum state court. An out-of-state plaintiff
who was genuinely worried about bias in state court, but who had waited
longer than the federal limitations period, would be forced to remain in
state court, thereby frustrating the purposes of diversity. In addition, a
defendant who was not worried about bias in state court might remove to
federal court solely to get the plaintiff’s action dismissed as time-barred,
thereby wasting the federal forum on matters unrelated to the purpose of
diversity. In short, vertical uniformity of court administration serves the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction.
Although the purposes of federal jurisdiction for non-federal actions
can generate borrowing considerations, which must be taken into account
when federal courts create federal common law rules of court
administering for such actions, it is important to recognize that these
considerations can be overridden by federal enacted law. It is true that
federal statutes and FRCPs that have standards different from those used
in a forum state court will frustrate the purposes of diversity, for example,
81. See Green, supra note 43, at 1888–90. Other scholars have come to the same conclusion.
See Alexander A. Reinert, Erie Step Zero, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2341 (2017).
82. 28 U.S.C § 1332(a)-(c) (2012).
83. E.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315, 336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Borchers, supra note 80, at 79–80; John P. Frank,
Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 22–28 (1948).
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by discouraging those who are legitimately worried about state court bias
from seeking out a federal forum. But it is a lawmaker’s prerogative to
create laws that frustrate the purposes of earlier laws.
Another puzzling question is what the term “inequitable
administration of the laws” means. Assume that a federal court sitting in
diversity in New York is entertaining a New York cause of action. If it
comes up with its own limitations period for the action rather than using
New York’s limitations period, that is apparently the inequitable
administration of the laws. But when a state court in Pennsylvania uses
Pennsylvania’s limitations period for that same New York action, law is
not inequitably administered. Why not? The reason cannot be that New
York wants the limitations period to follow its cause of action into federal
court in New York but not into state court in Pennsylvania, for the federal
court must use New York’s limitations period even if New York officials
don’t care whether it is used. Sovereignty considerations are not in play.
Furthermore, why is it the inequitable administration of the laws if a
federal court comes up with its own common law limitations period for
the New York action, but not if Congress creates a statute of limitations
for the action?
Again, I think the answer can be found in the purposes of diversity.
Congress created diversity jurisdiction to provide a forum free from the
bias that might exist in state court. Its purpose was not to license federal
courts to create independent federal common law standards for court
administration in the light of any conceivable federal interest. 84
Presumptively the federal common law standard they use should be the
same as that of the forum state. If they ignore this policy of vertical
uniformity and create a limitations period different from the one used in
state court, a wrong has been done to the party disadvantaged by the
federal period. She is being treated differently from someone who could
remain in state court, without a valid reason. That is the inequitable
administration of the laws. But since the wrong she suffers exists because
the federal court ignored a congressional policy of vertical uniformity, no
wrong is done to her if Congress abandons that policy by enacting a statute
of limitations.
Tying the inequity to the purposes of diversity also explains why
there is no inequity when a Pennsylvania state court uses its own
limitations period for the New York action. Diversity exists to solve a
84. Notice that this policy exists even if there is no possibility of forum shopping (because
Congress has given federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over the non-federal cause of action). Thus,
Chief Justice Warren had good reason in Hanna to identify the inequitable administration of the laws
as a separate consideration.
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problem with jurisdiction in state court, and federal courts making
common law rules concerning court administration in diversity cases need
to take that fact into account. But the Pennsylvania legislature did not give
Pennsylvania state courts jurisdiction over New York causes of action
solely as a means of avoiding some problem with jurisdiction in New
York state court. Its purposes in allowing New York actions into
Pennsylvania state court are much broader. As a result, Pennsylvania state
courts have few, if any, reasons to borrow standards from New York state
courts.
What about supplemental jurisdiction? Do its purposes—in
combination with the purposes of the statute that provided the federal
court with original jurisdiction—generate policies of vertical uniformity,
as has been widely assumed? 85 Supplemental jurisdiction exists to avoid
the inefficiency that would otherwise occur if non-federal actions without
their own source of federal jurisdiction had to be brought in state court.
Furthermore, supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases helps foster the
purposes of diversity. If there were no supplemental jurisdiction, the cost
of duplicative litigation might discourage a party who is worried about
bias in state court from seeking out the protection of a federal forum for
her diversity actions. 86
What is more, since the actions with diversity jurisdiction and those
with supplemental jurisdiction can be litigated together in federal court,
vertical uniformity is needed or the purposes of diversity will be
frustrated. Assume that the federal court applied an independent federal
common law limitations period to an action with supplemental
jurisdiction that is shorter than that used in a forum state court. The
plaintiff might not seek out a federal forum—despite being worried about
state court bias—because of this disadvantageous federal law. And the
defendant might seek out a federal forum even though she had no worry
about state court bias. 87 Similar frustration of the purposes of diversity
would occur if the federal court used an independent federal common law
limitations period for an action with supplemental jurisdiction that was
85. E.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Godin
v.
Schencks
629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010).
86. See Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts,
87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1422 (1999); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966); Miller Aviation v. Milwaukee Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 273 F.3d 722, 731–32 (7th Cir. 2001);
Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 449 (1991).
87. See Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is there Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?
78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 385–87 (1980).
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longer than that used by a forum state court. To ensure that choices of a
federal forum are made for the right reason, procedural uniformity
between federal and forum state court concerning actions with
supplemental jurisdiction is needed.
Furthermore, even if concerns about forum shopping are set aside, a
federal court’s application of a different limitations period would be the
inequitable administration of the laws. Congress created supplemental
jurisdiction in diversity cases to overcome the inefficiency of separate
litigation in state court and to foster the purposes of diversity. There is no
reason to think that this was a license to federal courts to create
independent federal common law standards of court administration in the
light of any conceivable federal interest. To the extent that a federal court
ignores this policy of vertical uniformity, it is inequitably administering
the laws. 88
To repeat, at this stage the federal court should consider the source
of federal jurisdiction and determine whether there are federal policies of
vertical uniformity. In diversity cases there are such policies, known as
the twin aims of Erie, which extend to actions with supplemental
jurisdiction. Whether there are such policies in connection with other
forms of federal jurisdiction needs to be assessed independently. The fact
that a non-federal cause of action is being entertained by the federal court
is not on its own a reason to conclude that such policies are implicated.
Only a confusion between sovereignty and borrowing considerations
would lead one to conclude otherwise. When a plaintiff sues on a nonfederal action in federal court, that is indeed a reason to worry about
sovereignty considerations—the state or foreign nation that created the
action may want a standard to follow it into federal court. But we have
left sovereignty considerations aside. The question now is solely whether
there are federal policies in favor of borrowing standards that would be
used by a forum state court. That depends upon why Congress gave the
federal court jurisdiction over the non-federal action.
A proper understanding of the twin aims allows us to make sense of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Klaxon. 89 I think it is clear that borrowing
considerations, not sovereignty considerations, are what motivated
Klaxon. Choice-of-law rules are about identifying and choosing between
sovereignty considerations. They allow a court to determine when a
sovereign wants its law to be used and to decide which sovereign wins

88. For the argument that policies of vertical uniformity exist concerning actions with
supplemental jurisdiction in federal question cases, see Green, supra note 43, at 1920–21.
89. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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when more than one has such a desire. To be sure, the forum state might
be one of those sovereigns that wants its law to be used. But the reason a
federal court uses the forum state’s choice-of-law rules cannot be because
the forum state wants the federal court to do so. 90 Even if it were true that
New York wanted a federal court in New York to use a New York rule
that picks New York law over Pennsylvania law, that would simply be a
more emphatic way of saying that New York wants its law to be used.91
Pennsylvania might have a similar desire that the federal court use a
Pennsylvania rule that picks Pennsylvania law over New York law. How
the federal court chooses between these sovereignty considerations
remains, and the principles for choosing cannot be found in the law of the
sovereigns the federal court is choosing between. The forum state’s
choice-of-law rules are used by federal courts for federal reasons—in
particular because of federal policies of vertical uniformity.
We can also see why Klaxon is such a controversial case. With
Klaxon in place, borrowing considerations can lead a federal court to
choose against the weight of sovereignty considerations. One’s view
about Klaxon essentially depends upon how important one thinks getting
sovereignty considerations right is compared to the policies of vertical
uniformity derived from the purposes of federal jurisdiction. For my part,
I think these policies are sufficiently weighty to make Klaxon justified, at
least in diversity cases and for actions with supplemental jurisdiction in
such cases.
If the statute giving the federal court jurisdiction generates no
policies of vertical uniformity, then the federal court is free to apply an
independent federal common law standard for the issue. If the statute
giving the federal court jurisdiction does generate policies of vertical
uniformity, however, the federal court needs to keep these in mind when
creating a federal common law rule for the issue.

90. For a reading of Klaxon as concerning sovereignty considerations, see Kermit Roosevelt
III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U.
L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2012).
91. In fact, I very much doubt that state supreme courts, if asked, would say they want their
choice-of-law rules to be used in other court systems. For a discussion, see Green, supra note 4, at
869–84.
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Question 11: Is one of the reasons Congress created federal
jurisdiction for the non-federal action an opposition to the standard that
state courts would apply to the issue?
Even if the purposes of federal jurisdiction generate general policies
of vertical uniformity, a federal court will not have a reason to borrow
standards from forum state courts if one of the problems federal
jurisdiction is meant to solve is the standards that state courts would apply
to the issue. For example, assume that Congress gave federal courts
diversity jurisdiction, in part, to avoid state court bias against those from
out of the state, as this bias expresses itself in the choice-of-law rules used
in state court. If that is so, then Klaxon is wrongly decided, and federal
courts should use independent federal common law standards concerning
choice of law. Although I do not think such a conclusion is justified in
connection with diversity jurisdiction, it is entirely possible that
Congress’s purpose in enacting the Class Action Fairness Act was, in part,
to provide a federal forum free from improper choice of law in state
court. 92 If so, federal courts with jurisdiction under the Act would be free
to come up with independent federal common law rules for choice of law.
Question 12: Can one identify the state court where the non-federal
action would likely have been brought but for federal jurisdiction?
I have occasionally spoken about policies of vertical uniformity as
recommending borrowing those standards that would be used by a forum
state court. This is not entirely accurate. They recommend borrowing
standards from the state court where the action would have been brought
but for federal jurisdiction. For this reason, one will not be able to borrow
those standards if one cannot identify what that state court is. The
(unspoken) assumption in diversity cases is that had there been no
diversity jurisdiction the action would have proceeded in the court of the
state where the federal court is located. When the defendants remove to
federal court, this assumption is clearly correct, since that is where the
case began. 93 When the plaintiffs have chosen to sue in federal court,
however, where the action would have been brought in the absence of
federal jurisdiction is a matter of some speculation. The plaintiffs’ choice
could have been between a federal court in one state (say, New York) and
92. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Choice of Law and Jurisdictional Policy in the Federal
Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1847 (2017).
93. This is true even if there is subsequent transfer to another federal district court. E.g., Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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a state court in another state (Pennsylvania). In such a case, the twin aims’
goal of avoiding forum shopping would be served if a federal court in New
York borrowed standards that would be used by a Pennsylvania state court
rather than a New York state court. In diversity cases, however, the
Supreme Court has apparently assumed—probably justifiably—that
plaintiffs making a choice between state and federal court usually choose
between a federal and state court within the same state.
But in some jurisdictional contexts, such as bankruptcy, the matter is
more complicated. As an initial matter, let us assume that the purposes of
bankruptcy jurisdiction generate policies of uniformity with the state court
where the action would otherwise have been brought. 94 Notice that such
borrowing considerations are independent of sovereignty considerations,
that is, the reasons that a federal court sitting in bankruptcy has to respect
state standards that the state wants to be used in federal court.95 Borrowing
considerations give a federal court reasons to use state standards even if
the state’s officials don’t care whether they are used.
How can one determine the consequences of these policies of vertical
uniformity? A federal court sitting in bankruptcy will usually be in the
district where the debtor resides. 96 But it can take jurisdiction of actions
against the debtor even if a state court where the federal court is located
would not have personal jurisdiction. 97 When the action had previously
been filed in a state court, there is no problem. The federal court borrows
standards from that court (which, it should be noted, is not necessarily in
the forum state). 98 Even if the action had not been previously filed in state
court, the matter is not that difficult if all the parties are residents of the
same state and the transaction at issue took place there. A court of that
state (which will usually be the forum state) will very likely have been
where the action would have been brought but for bankruptcy
jurisdiction. 99 In some cases, however, one cannot identify where the
94. For such an argument, see Green, supra note 43, at 1922–25. In my discussion I speak of
a federal court sitting in bankruptcy, but my reasoning applies to a bankruptcy court too.
95. See Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); Green, supra note 43, at 1922–23.
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d).
98. In re Coudert Bros., 673 F.3d 180, 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Connecticut
limitations period rather than New York’s period should be used for an action against the debtor,
under either Connecticut or United Kingdom law, originally filed in state court in Connecticut, but
ultimately entertained by bankruptcy court in New York).
99. Green, supra note 43, at 1927–28; See In re Johnson, 453 B.R. 433 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)
(holding that a Florida statute forbidding a plaintiff to plead punitive damages until he offers evidence
showing a reasonable basis for that relief should be used by a bankruptcy court in Florida entertaining
an action under Florida law by bankruptcy trustee on behalf of Florida debtor against Florida
defendant).
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action would have been brought had there been no bankruptcy. If so, a
federal court has no choice but to employ a federal common law standard
for the issue. Keep in mind, however, that this is only a reason for the
federal court not to borrow standards from a state court. It is not a reason
for the federal court to ignore sovereignty considerations that recommend
using state law.
Question 13: Is the difference between the independent federal
common law standard and the standard that would be used by the state
court where the action would have been brought but for federal
jurisdiction so significant that the federal court’s use of the independent
federal standard would violate federal policies recommending vertical
uniformity?
At this point the court needs to identify the standard that would be
used by the state court where the action would have been brought absent
federal jurisdiction and a candidate independent federal common law
standard, which is the one that would be used in the absence of any federal
policies of vertical uniformity. The federal standard might have already
been created in federal question cases, where federal courts are not bound
by policies of vertical uniformity. Or federal courts might have created
the standard in the context of Erie problems, without recognizing them as
such and so ignoring the possibility that a state or foreign standard should
have been used.
It is also common for the federal standard to have never been
articulated before, because federal courts simply have, as an unthinking
matter, not done something that is demanded in a forum state court. In
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 100 one could say that there was a federal
common law standard under which out-of-state corporations did not have
to register to do business before bringing suit, because federal courts
simply did not make such a demand. But they never recognized that they
had this standard until the defendant in Woods argued that Mississippi’s
registration requirement should be used.
Sometimes the content of the federal standard is a matter of first
impression. There is no federal standard at all, not even as a judicial
practice. It does not follow that the other sovereign’s standard should be
used (as some flowcharts on Erie suggest). Rather, the federal court needs
to come up with a candidate federal common law standard by looking to
relevant federal interests, excluding policies of vertical uniformity.
100.
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The court then determines whether the difference between the
standards violates policies of vertical uniformity. In diversity cases, the
court asks the following two questions. First, would the difference lead to
forum shopping, by discouraging a party worried about state court bias
from going to federal court or by encouraging a party not worried about
state court bias to seek out federal court? Second, would the difference
result in the inequitable administration of the laws, because parties would
be treated differently in a federal and a forum state court for no valid
reason? If the federal policies of vertical uniformity are not violated or
any violation is de minimis, the independent federal common law standard
can be used. The example offered in Hanna is differences between a
federal common law service rule and the forum state’s rule. 101 If the
federal policies of vertical uniformity are violated, that is a strong reason
to borrow the standard from the relevant state court.
Question 14: Are there sufficiently strong countervailing federal
interests in favor of the independent federal standard, interests that
would overcome federal policies in favor of vertical uniformity?
The twin aims of Erie and other policies of vertical uniformity
recommended by the statute giving the federal court jurisdiction are
important. But they are not dispositive. They can be defeated by
countervailing considerations, that is, sufficiently strong federal reasons
in favor of an independent federal common law standard. 102 The idea is
that Congress did not command federal courts to borrow state standards.
Rather, by creating federal jurisdiction it brought into being strong
policies in favor of vertical uniformity, policies that can be overridden by
other federal interests.
Although identifying countervailing federal interests is not easy, they
must be sufficiently strong to overcome the weight of policies of vertical
uniformity. The simple convenience of uniform rules for court
administration across the federal court system is not enough. An example
of countervailing federal interests that were sufficiently strong are those

101. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965).
102. Although the possibility of the twin aims’ being defeated by countervailing federal interests
was not mentioned in Hanna; in Gasperini, the Court mentioned such interests as relevant in deciding
common law Erie problems. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 431–32 (1996).
Furthermore, the Court also mentioned countervailing federal interests (although not Byrd by name)
in Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001). They have also been
relied upon by lower federal courts. E.g., Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, 289 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir.
2002); Moling v. O’Reilly Auto., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 956, 975–76 (W.D. Tenn. 2011).
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justifying federal courts’ choice of federal over forum state standards for
forum non conveniens, discussed above. 103
IV. CONCLUSION
As the flowchart and explanations offered above have shown,
solving Erie problems is a complicated matter. But in their essentials, Erie
problems are like the choice-of-law problems faced by state courts. The
only major difference is that borrowing considerations play a much larger
role in Erie problems. This is because the purposes standing behind a
congressional grant of federal jurisdiction over a non-federal action
commonly recommend uniformity of procedure with the state court where
the action would otherwise have been brought. No comparable borrowing
considerations are generated when state law gives a state court jurisdiction
over an action under sister-state or foreign law. Borrowing considerations
are therefore rarer in the choice-of-law problems faced by state courts.
When these borrowing considerations do exist in an Erie problem—
and, to repeat, they do so only when they can be justified by the purposes
of the congressional grant of jurisdiction—they play an important role in
determining the content of the federal common law procedural rules the
federal court uses when entertaining the non-federal action. There is a
reason for these rules to borrow content from the procedure of the state
court where the non-federal action would otherwise have been brought.
But the role of these federal borrowing considerations, although
important, is not dispositive. They can be overridden by sufficiently
strong countervailing federal interests in favor of an independent federal
common law standard.

103.
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